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COLLECTIVE PENALTIES AND INDUCEMENT OF SELF-REPORTING 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Random accidents can be contained by collective penalties. These penalties are not likely 
to be enforced but rather induce self-reporting that enhances welfare due to early 
containment. Self-reporting under collective penalties increases overall welfare, but may 
increase expected environmental cost. Even when regulation is constrained by an upper 
limit on the acceptable collective penalty, the threat of collective penalties can induce an 
incentive-compatible mutual insurance scheme under which a side-payment is made to 
the agent that self-reports an accident. This self-reporting mechanism is welfare-
improving, but first-best outcomes can only be obtained when the collective penalty is 
unconstrained, or when an honor system applies. In cases when there is a new externality 
that requires fast response (avian flu), collective penalties can compliment or substitute 
for monitoring. 
 
 
Résumé : Pénalités collectives – incitations à l’auto-déclaration 
 
Nous étudions le rôle des pénalités collectives pour donner des incitations à déclarer un 
accident environnemental, dans un modèle d’agents hétérogènes et dans lequel les 
inspections sont irréalisables. Une déclaration immédiate d’un accident permet au 
régulateur de prendre des mesures pour minimiser le coût social de l’accident (en effet, 
sans une auto-déclaration, des problèmes d’information créent des délais dans la 
réparation du dommage). Nous démontrons l’impact distributif d’une politique d’auto-
déclaration des dommages, ce qui pourrait expliquer la réticence des associations 
environnementales envers une telle politique. Ensuite nous analysons le cas où il existe 
une limite supérieure sur le montant de la pénalité collective acceptable et nous montrons 
comment une politique de pénalités collectives peut inciter à une action collective pour 
récompenser un agent qui fait une auto-déclaration de son accident. Le mécanisme que 
nous proposons fonctionne comme une assurance mutuelle afin de récompenser un agent 
qui auto-déclare un accident. Nous évaluons le bien-être social sous l’action collective 
par rapport à un statu quo avec pénalités individuelles, et nous proposons des conditions 
qui entraînent une amélioration de bien-être. Néanmoins, les choix optimaux d’effort de 
prévention nécessitent soit une pénalité collective sans contrainte, soit un code d’honneur. 
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COLLECTIVE PENALTIES AND INDUCEMENT OF SELF-REPORTING 
 
1. Introduction 
Many negative externalities pose a regulatory challenge because the regulator cannot 
identify the individual source of the damage. The agents are often members of a group, a 
particular industry, or a regional cluster. This is the essence of the nonpoint source 
pollution problem, which is basically a moral hazard problem since the regulator cannot 
monitor individual actions. Second-best regulations have been implemented to deal with 
the problem, such as input taxes or regulation based on observable technology or some 
other proxy variable related to the creation of pollution. Based on Holmstrom’s (1982) 
work on optimal incentives for teams, Meran and Schwalbe (1987) and Segerson (1988) 
suggested that collective penalties can be used as a first-best solution.  The collective 
penalty has been termed the ambient tax when based upon overall ambient quality. It 
works by imposing the full social marginal damage cost on each polluter, who thus faces 
incentives to cut back pollution to the socially optimal level. 
 The particular moral hazard problem that we study here is the problem of 
stochastic accidents when the regulator cannot trace the damage to its source among a 
large population of potential polluters.  Examples include spills of hazardous chemicals, 
leakage from oil fields into groundwater, the release of a microbe or the propagation of a 
virus that spread a disease, or forest fires. These examples are all cases of externalities 
that are difficult to trace to their origin, but where quick detection will reduce the social 
damage. In some instances, public monitoring systems can be built up to contain the 
damage. The U. S. Customs’ control of imported fruit and vegetables in order to prevent 
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exotic pests from infesting agriculture is one example. But monitoring systems take time 
to establish, and may be very costly, or simply not feasible. In such cases, self-reporting 
of accidents would enable early containment and thus a lower social damage than if the 
regulator at a later time were to discover the accident. The problem is how to induce self-
reporting when it is optimal to do so.  Here we study the role that collective penalties can 
play in a policy to induce self-reporting. 
 Collective punishments exist in many different contexts. Markets sometimes 
exercise collective punishments and rewards (Winfree and McCluskey, 2005). When 
consumers cannot distinguish between many different producers, they have to pay a 
regional price premium for French wine, Italian design, and punish Romanian wines. If a 
producer wants to distinguish herself, she has to invest in building a brand. Externality 
control, which is what we address in this paper, is about building market-like solutions: 
collective punishment and rewards exist in the market to overcome information 
deficiencies. Collective punishment is used to slow the spread of diseases. In May 2003, 
the discovery of a single reported case of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) led 
to an immediate ban on exports of beef from the United States to Japan and Canada. The 
European Union imposed a worldwide ban on beef exports from the United Kingdom in 
order to limit the effects of its outbreak of BSE. Similar export bans were imposed as a 
means to limit the propagation of foot-and-mouth disease. Japan and China will not 
import produce from California if an outbreak of the Mediterranean fruitfly has been 
reported in the state. 
 Collective punishment has furthermore been used to end bad practices causing 
environmental or behavioral externalities. The US Food and Drug Administration banned 
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Chilean fruit after cyanide was found in two grapes in 1989. The most famous case is 
probably the US 1990-91 boycott of Mexican tuna to stop the use of net threatening 
dolphins. Collective environmental punishments may also be used as a trade barrier. 
Indeed, the GATT dispute settlement panel eventually ruled in favor of Mexico. There 
are several other noted examples of use of collective penalties to achieve environmental 
ends. In the Kesterson debacle, the U. S. government threatened to cut federal water 
project supply to farmers in the California San Joaquin Valley if the ramifications of the 
drainage problem had not been addressed. Under the Everglades Forever Act in Florida, a 
land tax is automatically increased every year for all farmers in the adjacent area if the 
aggregate phosphorus reduction goal is not met for the wetlands (Ribaudo and Caswell, 
1999). There are various incidents of close-down of industrial activities when smog levels 
exceed a certain level. The ban on South African exports to protest apartheid can also be 
seen as a collective punishment to counteract a behavioral externality. 
 All these examples of collective penalties demonstrate that they can act as a 
credible threat. In this paper we will argue that the main advantage of a policy based on 
collective penalties, such as the ambient tax, is to induce collective action for early 
containment and reduction of the damage imposed on society. Damage from pollution 
and health risks can be assessed by using a risk-generating function which describes the 
stages of contamination, transfer and fate, and exposure and gives a dose-response 
function (Lichtenberg and Zilberman, 1988). The key to minimizing damage is early 
intervention. Since risk is a dynamic process (a plume of chemicals moves, a virus 
propagates), there are time lags, and the earlier the regulator can intervene in the transfer- 
and-fate process, the smaller will be the damage. We do not develop a dynamic model, 
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but the essence of the problem is that early action brings about a lower social damage 
cost. In cases when there is a new externality or a source of damage that requires fast 
response and the regulator has limited capacity to monitor individual agents, collective 
punishment may be used or introduced as a threat. The avian flu illustrates the importance 
of early warning and self-reporting in order to reduce the costs of a human flu pandemic 
(Fouchier et al., 2005). A regional outbreak may not be reported, and even if the regulator 
knows that there has been an outbreak in a certain region, she does not always know the 
source. It is important to require poultry farmers to report an outbreak early and to refrain 
them from selling the infected chicken.  
 In suggesting that a practical application of collective penalties can be to induce 
self-reporting by polluters, the current article is closely related to the literature on self-
reporting and the work on law enforcement spawned by the seminal articles by Becker 
(1968) and Stigler (1970). Existing studies of self-reporting (Malik, 1993; Kaplow and 
Shavell, 1994; Innes, 1999a, 1999b, 2000) rely on the background threat of a public 
monitoring system that imposes a penalty on the agent with some probability.1  If the 
penalty upon self-reporting is set at a lower level than the standard penalty, self-reporting 
can be induced.  However, random monitoring systems are not always feasible or can be 
prohibitively costly to establish. When the outbreak of a disease occurs, its origin is not 
easy to establish. Random monitoring may also be impractical when dealing with 
infrequent accidents, for example, when toxic releases lead to water contamination, 
where the pollution dissipates quickly and it may be very costly to obtain information that 
enables the regulator to trace the pollution back to its source. 
                                                 
1 Some other articles on environmental law enforcement also discuss self-reporting but as part of an 
exogenous government policy (Harford, 1987; Livernois and McKenna, 1999).  
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In this article we investigate self-reporting in the case when the regulator cannot 
invest in random monitoring.  As in Innes (2000), the model allows for heterogeneous 
agents. We show how a collective penalty can work as a threat and induce agents to self-
report, first in a simple model with no constraint on the collective penalty, then in a 
model encompassing an upper limit on the feasible collective fine. In this situation, we 
analyze an incentive-compatible mutual insurance scheme under which a side-payment is 
made to the agent that self-reports an accident, and identify the conditions under which it 
is welfare-improving. 
 Levinson’s (2003) discussion of legal cases contends that one of the merits of 
collective penalties is “creating incentives for the wrongdoer himself to confess.”  He 
also argues that regulated groups (e.g., firms) have better information than regulators. 
Avoiding collective sanctions can be a cause of group solidarity to overcome transaction 
costs and develop mechanisms to reduce the burden. The mutual insurance scheme 
presented here is such a mechanism.2  
 The outline of the paper is the following. In section 2, we present the model and 
derive the first-best benchmark. In section 3, we first show how collective penalties can 
be used to induce self-reporting, and we study the distributional impact of self-reporting 
on private surplus and on the environment. Next, we introduce limits on the level of 
collective penalties and determine the incentives for self-reporting in this constrained 
situation.  Section 4 then shows how, in this constrained situation, collective penalties 
                                                 
2 Economists have also recognized the leverage opportunities from group delegation and have studied the 
use of peer monitoring to alleviate the regulator’s incomplete information, in particular with respect to 
credit networks (see, for example, Varian, 1990; Arnott and Stiglitz, 1991; Armendariz, 1999; Ghatak 
1999), and work teams (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1990). The idea of solidary networks of group members 
is not new; already the Medieval Guilds of merchants introduced informal rules of conduct that relied upon 
group sanctions (Greif, Milgrom, and Weingast, 1994). 
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nevertheless can induce the group of agents that is regulated to set up a collective 
compensation system for self-reporting. The welfare effects of such collective action are 
analyzed. We conclude with a discussion of the role of collective penalties and honor 
systems.  
2. The Model 
We model a large population of N risk neutral agents, for which the regulator cannot trace 
any accidents that may happen.  The accident can take the form of a release of a 
pernicious microbe, or a hazardous waste spill.3  The probability that agent i causes an 
accident is gi.  The probabilities are independent and it is furthermore assumed that the 
probability of an accident is small so that only one accident occurs at a given time. The 
probability of an accident is a decreasing function of the unobserved level of care agent i 
uses, iX , with 
2
20, 0
i i
i i
g g
X X
∂ ∂< >∂ ∂ . The regulator cannot infer the level of care chosen by 
the firm from firm characteristics such as technology. The chosen level of care, X, is 
assumed to be contained in 0, X   . By definition, gi  is in [ ]0,1  and, depending on the 
hazard problem, gi is bounded above by some small number g  where ( )0ig X g= = , 
with 
∂gi 0( )
∂Xi arbitrarily large and 
∂gi X ( )
∂Xi  arbitrarily small. 
                                                 
3 Strand (1994) also studies regulation of stochastic accidents where the damage from an accident is fixed, 
the firm’s output is exogenous and the regulator can observe the fixed initial investment in technology. The 
solution proposed by Strand involves the regulator subsidizing the firm to take the first-best level of care, 
also when technology is variable. As noted by Strand (1994), practical implementation of such a policy is 
difficult when regulators are budget-constrained.  
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Agent i's profit before any regulatory penalty is denoted πi Xi( ). We assume that 
devoting time and resources to accident prevention has an opportunity cost on private 
profits, such that:   
∂π i
∂Xi < 0 ,
∂2π i
∂Xi2 ≤ 0 , 
by standard assumptions of a convex cost function. Furthermore, ( )0i Xπ π= = , and 
( ) 0i Xπ = . 
Kaplow and Shavell (1994) analyzed two fundamental advantages of self-
reporting: monitoring cost savings for the regulator and a reduction in the cost of risk-
bearing. An additional advantage of self-reporting (noted in Kaplow and Shavell, 1994, 
and modeled formally in Innes, 1999a) is the reduction in the damage cost when agents 
can undertake remediation activities. This is the essential advantage of self-reporting in 
our model. 
The social cost of an accident that is not reported is CH.  However, if an agent 
takes early action, or reports the accident promptly so that containment measures can be 
implemented by the regulator as early as possible before damage spreads, the resulting 
damage would be CL < CH . We call this early containment since we wish to distinguish 
this case from when it is the regulator that remediates the damage upon gaining 
knowledge of the accident. An agent’s containment actions are assumed to be site-
specific and visible (as in Hutchinson and van’t Veld, 2005). Examples include 
containing the diffusion of a plume of toxic chemicals or the movement of an infectious 
disease such as foot and mouth disease in cattle, or limiting the spread of a forest fire by 
action while it is in the agent’s territory.  Let mi represent the cost to agent i of early 
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containment and self-reporting. We thus link the two decisions of early containment and 
self-reporting as one. If an agent has an accident and takes some action to contain it, he 
will also self-report the accident, since he can show that action has been taken to 
minimize damage. On the other hand, an agent that self-reports always has to make some 
extra effort to contain the problem once deciding to self-report.4 The larger part of the 
agent’s cost is related to early containment, whereas the actual self-reporting cost is likely 
to be quite low (the equivalent of a phone call in some cases). When L i HC m C+ < , early 
containment and self-reporting improves social welfare. We assume mi is contained in an 
interval defined as im m m< < . While we know that L HC m C+ < , we cannot exclude the 
case that  L HC m C+ > , and the model will allow for both possible cases. 
 
2.1 The first-best benchmark 
 
We can now define the socially optimal level of care under complete information. First, 
define the optimal level of care with or without early containment: 
 
( )arg max ( ) ( )Ci i i L i i iX X C m g Xπ= − +       (1) 
)()(maxarg iiHii
N
i XgCXX −= π        (2) 
 
                                                 
4 Tort law requires some effort. The most intuitive example being a hit-and-run car accident; someone who 
self-reports an accident but takes no effort to mitigate the impact, seriously prejudices his position with the 
regulator. 
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where CiX  is the level of care taken when early containment and self-reporting costs are 
accounted for, and NiX is the level of care taken with no containment. Under either case 
each agent should balance its marginal cost of care with the marginal social benefit 
resulting from accident prevention. 
Depending on the social cost of an accident, we can have a corner solution or an 
interior solution. When both 0)()( <− NiiHNii XgCXπ   and 
( )( ) ( ) 0C Ci i L i i iX C m g Xπ − + < , a corner solution is optimal, i.e. close-down of the firm. 
We will assume that an interior solution always exists. For such an interior solution, in 
the unlikely case of two possible equilibria, the profit-maximizing level of care with early 
containment is where ( )2 22 2( ) ( ) 0i i i iL i
i i
X g XC m
X X
π∂ ∂− + ≤∂ ∂ , and the marginal profit function 
intersects the marginal expected cost function from above. A similar condition holds for 
the profit-maximizing level of care without early containment.  
The social optimum can now be defined as the solution to: 
 
( ){ } ( ){ }
1 1
( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( )
i
N N
C C N N
i i i L i i i i i i H i i
i i
X C m g X X C g XMaxγ γ π γ π= =− + + − −∑ ∑  (3) 
 
where γi defines whether it is socially optimal to contain and self-report environmental 
damage from source i. 
 
The optimal value of γi is: 
1=iγ   when ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )C C N Ni i L i i i i i H i iX C m g X X C g Xπ π− + ≥ −   (4a) 
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0=iγ  when  ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )C C N Ni i L i i i i i H i iX C m g X X C g Xπ π− + < − . 
 
For the subsequent analysis we will define the index iˆ for which an agent would be 
indifferent between self-reporting and not. If agents are ordered according to the cost of 
containment, mi, where agent i=1 has the lowest cost and agent i=N has the highest cost 
of containment, there will be at most one agent, defined by iˆ , for which the following 
condition holds: 
 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )C C N Ni i L i i i i i H i iX C m g X X C g Xπ π− + = −      (4b) 
 
For agents with ii ˆ≤ , it will be socially optimal to contain environmental damage, 
whereas for agents with i> iˆ , it will not be optimal to take early action.  
 
3. Self-Reporting and Early Damage Detection 
 
The occurrence of an accident, however, is private information before the regulator 
detects it. All the regulator can do is to impose a fixed penalty on each agent in the 
population when the regulator detects the damage. In this Section, we will show that 
when there are no constraints on the level of the collective penalty, it can be used to 
induce self-reporting and lead to the socially optimal outcome. 
Given this policy, the decision choice of agent i, facing a collective penalty P is: 
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1
( ) ( )
i
N
i i i i
X i
X P g XMax π
=
− ∑ . 
 
The agent will choose a level of care characterized by the following first-order condition:  
 
 ( ) ( ) 0 .i i i i
i i
X g X
P i
X X
π∂ ∂− = ∀∂ ∂  (5) 
 
As usual, the level of care increases with the level of the penalty: 
 
2 2
2 2
( )
0
( ) ( )
i i
i i
i i i i
i i
g X
dX X
dP X g XP
X X
π
∂
∂= > ∂ ∂− ∂ ∂ 
 
 
If the regulator does not consider self-reporting as an option, he will set the collective 
penalty P = CH in order to internalize the damage, given that the social cost of an accident 
that is not reported is CH. In the extreme case with a very high level of damage cost 
without early containment this can lead to a situation where the policy forces all firms to 
close down. If firms still operate, welfare is defined as 
( ) ( )0
1 1
N N
N N
i i H i i
i i
W X C g Xπ
= =
= −∑ ∑ .5 
                                                 
5 We assume a small industry with perfectly elastic demand, so the model excludes any effects on consumer 
surplus. In order to keep a simple model, we also do not include a marginal cost of public funds and any 
increase in government revenue is here a pure transfer. 
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Now, allow self-reporting and early clean-up. Detecting and containing an 
accident early due to self-reporting reduces social damages from CH to CL. On the other 
hand, self-reporting is costly to the agent since the nature of a dose-response function 
requires a self-reporting agent to incur some extra effort to contain the damage. This cost 
is represented by mi in our model. A self-reporting policy would thus offer a reduced 
penalty upon self-reporting, defined as FS < P. Given that an accident has occurred, an 
agent i will self-report iff 
 
 
( )S iF m P+ <  (6) 
 
If the condition in Equation (6) holds for all agents, then complete self-reporting will 
occur. Depending on the cost of containment and self-reporting, the condition may not 
hold for some agents and those agents will not self-report an accident.  
 Introducing self-reporting now changes the care levels of those agents that choose 
to self-report in case of an accident, since the level of care is increasing with the penalty. 
From the definition in Equation (2), the level of care taken under the collective penalty 
P=CH equals NiX . The level of care taken under self-reporting is defined as 
( )arg max ( ) ( )Si i i S i i iX X F m g Xπ= − + . 
Agents that choose the strategy to self-report will take a lower level of care than 
under the collective penalty ( N Si iX X− > 0), since .S iF m P+ <  Consequently, the risk of 
having an accident increases for agents that self-report: ( ) ( )S Ni i i ig X g X> .  However, 
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because there will be early containment, the social cost of damages will be smaller if 
L i HC m C+ < . 
The regulator’s problem is to choose P and FS  to induce the optimal level of self-
reporting: 
 ( ){ } ( ){ }
, , 1 1
( ( )) ( ( )) 1 ( ( )) ( ( ))
S i
N N
S S
i i i S L i i i S i i i H i iF P i i
Max X F C m g X F X P C g X Pδ δ π δ π= =− + + − −∑ ∑  
  (7) 
where Siδ  is an indicator variable; Siδ =1 if agent i self-reports an accident, Siδ =0 if not. 
The solution to this problem leads to the following Proposition: 
 
Proposition 1: A collective penalty P = CH  with a reduced fine for self-reporting FS = CL 
will induce self-reporting of stochastic accidents. Under this policy the socially optimal 
level of care can be induced and a welfare gain is obtained compared to the benchmark 
policy of collective penalties only. 
Proof: In Appendix. 
 
The proof in the Appendix shows that the levels of care induced by this policy 
correspond to the socially optimal levels of care: NiX and 
S C
i iX X= . With information 
about CH and CL, the regulator can thus induce all agents below the previously defined 
critical level iˆ  to self-report, and agents with ˆi i>  not to self-report. Depending on the 
costs of self-reporting, different patterns of self-reporting can occur. If  iˆ N≥ , all agents 
should self-report. If ˆ 1i < , then no self-reporting is optimal. Whenever the critical agent 
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iˆ  is in the interval [ ]N,1 , some intermediate level of self-reporting is optimal. An 
alternative expression for welfare under the optimal policy is thus: 
 
( ){ } { }ˆ*
ˆ1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
i N
S S N N
i i L i i i i i H i i
i i i
W X C m g X X C g Xπ π
= =
= − + + −∑ ∑ .   (8) 
 
To sum up, the literature has previously shown that self-reporting can be induced 
with a policy of random penalties (Kaplow and Shavell, 1994; Innes, 1999a, 1999b, 
2000). We study a different benchmark policy here: the case when the regulator cannot 
invest in a monitoring and detection system. In this case, we have shown that self-
reporting can be induced using fixed certain penalties. The self-reporting policy works 
because of the threat of the collective fine imposed on all firms when an accident is 
discovered. The role of the collective penalty is thus double; on the one hand, it induces 
higher levels of care by itself. On the other hand, it also serves to increase the incentives 
for agents to self-report an accident. 
 
3.1. The distributional effects of self-reporting 
 
The inducement of self-reporting by a collective penalty has a distributional impact. 
Since there is no change for agents that do not self-report, it is sufficient to study the 
change in net welfare resulting from the agents that choose to self-report, i.e., the first 
term in Equation (8). The introduction of incentives for self-reporting will result in a 
social welfare improvement as well as an increase in private surplus. Since we consider 
two policy options where the externalities are fully internalized, the social welfare gain 
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from allowing self-reporting is identical to the improvement in the net private surplus 
after penalties. The net social gain from self-reporting when there is a collective penalty 
is thus: 
 
( )ˆ* 0
1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
i
N S S N
H i i L i i i i i i i
i
environmental impact market impact
W W W C g X C m g X X Xπ π
=
     ∆ = − = − + + −      
∑ 144444424444443 144424443  (9)  
 
The net social gain from a self-reporting policy is made up of the environmental 
impact and the increase in the private surplus in the final good market – the market 
impact. The environmental impact of self-reporting can be decomposed further into two 
terms:  
 
( ) ( ){ }ˆ
1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
i
N S N S N
i i H L i i i i i L i i i i i
i
W g X C C m g X g X C m X Xπ π
=
   ∆ = − − − − + + −   ∑ (10) 
 
The first term is the gain from early action. However, self-reporting also induces a lower 
level of care than under a policy of fixed penalties: N Si iX X− >0. The impact of this is 
two-fold; on the one hand, it increases the private surplus from production (the third 
term), a benefit that can be added to the gain from lower damage due to early action. On 
the other hand, it simultaneously increases the risk of an accident (the second term), and 
this loss has to be deducted from the welfare gain. The optimal level of care obtained 
under self-reporting thus implies a trade-off between the gain from lower damage when 
an accident occurs and the impact from two effects resulting from a lower level of care 
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than under a fixed penalty. By a revealed preference argument the private surplus is 
always larger under self-reporting if it is voluntary. As seen above, the environmental 
impact of self-reporting is ambiguous, however. It is defined as the sum of the 
environmental cost savings following early containment (net of containment and self-
reporting costs) when an accident occurs and the increase in the expected cost of an 
accident due to the increase in the probability of having an accident. By using the 
elasticity of the accident probability function with respect to the level of care, gxε  = 
( )
( )
S S
i i i
S S
i i i
g X X
X g X
 ∂− ∂ 
, we can derive a condition that determines when the environmental 
impact is positive. 
 
Proposition 2a: The private surplus always increases under self-reporting, but the 
introduction of self-reporting may increase the expected environmental damage. 
 
Proposition 2b: 
 If  ( )
( )
S
H i i
N
L i i i
C g X
C m g X
>+ , or gxε <
( ) SH L i i
N S
H i i
C C m X i
C X X
− +    ∀   −  
, the environmental 
impact from self-reporting is positive. 
 
Proof: In Appendix. 
 
Although the net social gain from self-reporting is positive, Proposition 2 shows 
that such a policy can encounter resistance from environmental groups. As shown above, 
the gain from self-reporting comes from the increase in private surplus following the 
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lower level of care under a self-reporting policy. The necessary condition for a net 
reduction in damages requires that the elasticity of the accident probability function is 
smaller than an amount determined largely by the percentage reduction in environmental 
damage costs from self-reporting if the accident probability were fixed. If the accident 
probability function is relatively inelastic with respect to the level of care, then the direct 
effect on damage reduction will outweigh the increase in the probability of an accident. 
This may not always be the case, though. If some groups consider that environmental 
damage reduction should carry more weight in social decision-making than private 
surplus, they are likely to focus on the increased environmental risk induced by a self-
reporting policy. The above analysis thus suggests why environmental groups may 
oppose a self-reporting policy.  
Up to now, we assumed that there were no upper limits on the penalties imposed 
by industry participation constraints. In the following, we will introduce the possibility of 
an upper bound on the fixed penalty (Section 3.2).  
 
3.2 Restricted collective penalties 
 
Now suppose that, because of political constraints, there exists an upper limit K to the 
fixed penalty that the regulator can implement. Environmental policy in particular is 
constrained by industrial profitability considerations. For example, effluent standards as 
defined in the U.S. Clean Water Act should be developed on the basis of economic 
achievability.6 Also in Europe, permits for industrial facilities are often based on an 
analysis of best available technology and its costs (OECD, 1999). Hence, the parameter K 
 19
reflects political considerations and commitment to achieving environmental goals. The 
direct consequence of a low K is to restrain the regulator’s choice of the collective 
penalty, and preclude the optimal solution from being reached. 
There are three possible cases for the interval of K: a) K>CH, b) 
CL+mi<K<CH, i∀ , and c) K < FS = CL. If a) holds, the constraint is irrelevant. If b) holds, 
the regulator can still induce self-reporting and early damage containment by setting the 
fixed penalty equal to K and the fine under self-reporting equal to CL, and the optimal 
level of self-reporting will be obtained. Given the condition on K, each individual agent 
will still have incentives to choose self-reporting. The interesting case that we will focus 
on here is case c) K < FS = CL. 
Under the constrained maximum penalty, the firm’s level of care will be: 
 
( ) ( )argKi i i i iX max X K g Xπ= −        (11) 
 
Given that K<FS, it is clear that the level of care Xi
K  will be lower than the level of care 
under the optimal self-reporting fine ( SF ),
S
iX . In fact, it is sub-optimal from society’s 
perspective. Welfare under a collective penalty set at K equals: 
1 1
( ) ( )
N N
K K K
i i H i i
i i
W X C g Xπ
= =
= −∑ ∑ . 
 
Would a policy of collective penalties, although restricted, still give firms incentives to 
self-report accidents? With a constrained penalty, agents can be induced to self-report as 
                                                                                                                                                 
6 33 U.S. Code 1311 Clean Water Act Sec 301 Effluent limitations. 
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long as the limit on the collective penalty exceeds the environmental damage cost when 
there is early action plus the individual cost of self-reporting. However, if the constraint 
is binding (K< CL + mi), i∀ , agents will have no individual incentives to self-report an 
accident unless the penalty upon doing so is set lower than or equal to K-mi.  
Since each agent pays for the occurrence of an accident, the group of agents could 
gain NK – (CL +mi) in total if the agent causing an accident voluntarily reported it.7 In 
Section 4 below, we will study how collective action could occur to organize self-
reporting in the case when the level of the fixed collective penalty is not enough to induce 
the individual agent to report voluntarily.8 
 
4. Collective Action and Self-Reporting Under a Constrained Collective Penalty 
 
When CL +mi >K, no agent will report an accident out of own self-interest. The only 
situation under which self-reporting would occur would be if the agent were to receive 
compensation for this from the other agents. In particularly homogenous communities, 
solidarity develops over time and is sustained by social norms. Community enforcement 
has been shown to be able to sustain cooperation in a repeated game context (Kandori, 
1992) or in a setting where there is strong peer pressure to deter free-riders (Kandel and 
                                                 
7 In this model, it is not possible for the agents to exploit the asymmetric information between them and the 
regulator and maximize the gain from collective self-reporting by having the agent with the minimum cost 
report the accident. The reason is that, once an accident is reported, measures to contain it necessarily need 
to be site-specific and visible to the regulator.  
8 Under the constraint on the maximum collective penalty, the regulator might be tempted to introduce 
incentives for self-reporting of the following sort: if an agent self-reports, he would only pay a penalty K-
mi. Under such a policy, the social damage costs would amount to CL+mi , and the other agents would be 
exempted from paying the collective penalty K. Nevertheless, a firm that chooses the strategy to self-report 
will still choose a sub-optimal level of care, since its effective penalty is K-mi. It is easy to show that the 
decentralized self-reporting scheme proposed in Section 4 dominates a self-reporting policy of this kind 
that is organized by the regulator under the constrained penalty K. 
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Lazear, 1992). In close-knit communities, agents can have explicit or implicit agreements 
to reimburse an agent that self-reports and pays the damage costs of an accident.9 The 
objective of this Section is to investigate whether such a collective side-payment system 
is feasible and examine its effects on social welfare. 
 
4.1. A mutual insurance scheme 
 
We will analyze a mutual insurance scheme under which agents agree on a symmetric 
side-payment iS  to the agent who has an accident and reports it. We assume that the risk 
functions of all agents are known and that there are no transaction costs connected with 
the side-payments. There are several examples where this can be the case, in particular, it 
applies to industrial clusters or industry sector associations, where firms already interact 
and have means of communication. In the context of risk neutral agents that we analyze 
here mutual insurance does not arise because of risk aversion, but rather because the 
agent wishes to insure herself against the reduction in profits resulting from the 
imposition of the collective penalty (which as we have seen can be as high as to close 
down operations). 
Under the mutual insurance scheme considered here, in the case where agent i has 
an accident, he would receive a payment Si by the other agents, and whenever another 
agent has an accident, agent i has to be willing to pay his share (1/N-1) of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
9 It is natural to assume that the regulator can impose the full damage cost on the responsible agent once an 
agent self-reports an accident. When no responsibility can be assigned, the collective penalty is constrained 
by a maximum limit K. 
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compensation for self-reporting. The following incentive-compatibility constraint would 
have to hold for an agent to voluntarily participate in and abide by such a scheme: 
  
( )
1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
ji i
N
M jM M K K
i i i i L i i j j i i i i
j i i
S
X g X C m S g X X g X K i
N
π π
≠ =
− + − − ≥ − ∀−∑ ∑  
           (12) 
where MiX  and 
K
iX  are defined by: 
{ }
{ }
arg max ( ) ( ) ( )
arg max ( ) ( )
M
i i i L i i i i
K
i i i i i
X X C m S g X
X X K g X
π
π
= − + −
= −  
 
A simple rule for the compensation payments by the other agents is that they will 
reimburse the self-reporting agent for his additional costs above the collective penalty:  
CL+ im -K. The subsidy is thus defined as i L iS C m K= + − . With a side-payment 
i L iS C m K= + − , it follows directly from Equation (12) that the sufficient and necessary 
condition for full participation is: 
 
( ) 0
1
L jK
j j
j i
C m K
g X K i
N≠
+ − − ≥ ∀ − ∑   .    (13) 
 
 
The expected payment ( )
1
L jK
j j
j i
C m K
g X
N≠
+ −
−∑  can be interpreted as a form of insurance 
premium that is paid in order to receive compensation by other agents in case of an 
accident. When all agents have identical costs of self-reporting, m, condition (13) 
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simplifies to LC mK
N
+≥ . Hence, if the collective fine is sufficiently high, or the self-
reporting and containment costs are sufficiently low, agents can organize a collective 
compensation system for self-reporting. In the case where agents have different costs of 
self-reporting, there will exist a minimum subsidy such that all agents are induced to 
participate, this minimum subsidy being defined by the agent with the highest costs of 
self-reporting: 
1
i L
i N
m NK Cmax
≤ ≤
= − . 
 
Proposition 3a: When the liability limit of the collective penalty is sufficiently high, or 
the costs of self-reporting are sufficiently low, a collective reporting system can be 
agreed upon among all agents if
1
L i
i N
NK C mmax
≤ ≤
− ≥ . 
 
The preceding results did not depend on the self-reporting costs being identical 
for every agent. Some homogeneity in self-reporting costs is necessary on the other hand. 
If there exists an agent i with self-reporting and containment costs that exceed those of 
the other agents by a large amount, i jm m>> , then 0iS =  but j jS m j i= ∀ ≠ . The 
side-payment scheme would no longer be symmetric, and the agent with high 
containment costs will not self-report, although he will pay his share of the compensation 
to other self-reporting agents. 
 
Proposition 3b: If an agent i has significantly higher self-reporting costs than the other 
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agents, such that ( ) ( )1( ) ( )
2
kMM
i i L i k k L k
k j i
g X C m K g X C m K
N ≠ ≠
+ − ≥ + −− ∑ ,  he will be 
excluded from the scheme, and the side-payment will equal 0,i j jS S m j i= = ∀ ≠ . 
Proof: In Appendix. 
 
The mutual insurance scheme suggested in this Section is designed so that agents have no 
incentives to renege on the mutual agreement and not pay their share of the costs once an 
accident has been reported. The scheme is quite information-demanding, however, since 
it requires agents to know not only the self-reporting costs of every single agent but also 
the accident probabilities of each other.  
One case where agents have an informational advantage over the regulator and 
also may know reasonably well each others’ costs and accident probabilities is the case of 
industrial zones. In India, much of the chemical industry is clustered in industrial estates. 
Although aggregate pollution is noticeable, it is very difficult for the state regulatory 
agency to monitor individual plants. Firms that are members of the industrial association 
of the estate have a significant advantage in monitoring efficiency and the provision of 
incentives for mutual monitoring and information exchange. Kathuria and Sterner (2002) 
analyze efforts to regulate chemical plants in the Ankleshwar Industrial Estate in the 
Indian state of Gujarat and argue that the local industrial association is much better 
informed than the state environmental agency, which has difficulties controlling the many 
small firms within the estate. Firms in the industrial association have a common interest 
in avoiding accidents and pollution incidents in order to maintain or enhance the 
reputation of the industrial estate. Existing interactions on the product market or 
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similarities in the production process among the firms in the estate make it likely that 
firms have better information on each other than the regulator. 
 The capacity of collective penalties to induce self-reporting and an associated 
compensation system relies on the existing cooperation among agents. In the industrial 
sector, membership of professional associations serves the purpose of creating a 
collective.  In the area of agriculture and the environment, water and drainage districts 
provide a forum for agents to create collective responsibility. In the United States there is 
an established legal tradition for self-taxing organizations to manage environmental 
problems. Drainage districts can be established with a qualified majority vote of property 
owners for the construction of canals, drains, and levees. Such drainage districts have the 
authority to inspect all land and levy tax payments on agents within their boundaries, and 
could work as an institution for decentralized regulation under collective penalties. 
Formal institutions such as drainage and water districts or informal social interaction that 
provides clear sanction and punishment rules and a sense of fairness among agents can 
serve as a foundation for effective collective action (Baland and Platteau, 1993, 1996). 
Informal cooperation plays a particularly important role in developing countries and in 
rural communities (Bardhan, 1993). 
 
4.2 The welfare effects of collective action for early containment and self-reporting 
 
Thus far we have not drawn any conclusions on the welfare effect of a full coalition 
between agents, but only studied the necessary and sufficient condition for agents to 
participate. The next step is to ask whether such collective action would lead to the 
 26
socially optimal level of care. Welfare under this arrangement can be written as follows 
(with Miδ =1 when agent i self-reports, and Miδ =0 if not): 
( ) ( )
1 1
( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( )
N N
M M M M M K K
i i i L i i i i i i H i i
i i
W X C m g X X C g Xδ π δ π
= =
   = − + + − −   ∑ ∑  
 
s.t. 
{ }
{ }
arg max ( ) ( ) ( )
arg max ( ) ( )
M
i i i L i i i i
K
i i i i i
X X C m S g X
X X K g X
π
π
= − + −
= −  
 
When Equation (13) holds for every agent, there is full participation in the mutual 
insurance scheme ( 1Mi iδ = ∀ ), and a comparison of welfare under the constrained 
collective penalty without self-reporting implies that welfare improves iff: 
 
( )
1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0
N
M K M K M K
i i i L i i i H i i
i
W W W X X C m g X C g Xπ π
=
 ∆ = − = − − + + > ∑  (14) 
 
With a subsidy to the self-reporting agent equal to i L iS C m K= + − , each agent will 
choose a level of care identical to the level under the constrained collective penalty 
( KiX ), and the above expression is positive iff 
 
( ){ }
1
( ) 0
N
K
i i H L i
i
g X C C m
=
− − >∑ .       (15) 
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The term ( ) ( )KH L i iC C g X−  represents the expected gain from early containment under 
self-reporting, whereas the expected cost of self-reporting is equal to ( )Ki i im g X . As 
known, a collective reporting system that induces self-reporting will increase welfare if 
the gain from early containment and self-reporting exceeds its cost: H L iC C m i− > ∀ . 
With heterogeneous agents, a sufficient condition for a welfare improvement is that 
1
0maxH L i
i N
C C m
≤ ≤
− − > . 
A comparison of the condition for full participation (Equation 13) with the 
condition for a welfare improvement (Equation 15) indicates when collective action for 
self-reporting improves welfare compared to the benchmark collective penalty. 
 
Proposition 4:  
(i) When L i HC m CK i
N N
+ < ≤ ∀ , mutual insurance organized under the threat of a 
collective penalty K will occur and will improve welfare ( 0M KW W W∆ = − ≥ ). 
Within this range, increases in K improve welfare. 
 
(ii)  If HCK
N
>  an inefficiently high level of self-reporting may occur under mutual 
insurance. 
 
(iii) If L iC mK i
N
+< ∀ , no self-reporting will occur under the collective penalty. 
 
Proof: In Appendix. 
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The proposition leads to a counter-intuitive result that there may be situations when the 
collective penalty is too low to induce the first-best outcome and yet sufficiently high to 
induce excessive self-reporting under mutual insurance. Full participation in a mutual 
insurance scheme may lead to situations where individuals with high cost of early 
containment will self-report. Thus, at least theoretically there may be situations where an 
increase in K may lead to a reduction in welfare. This may occur if the benefit of 
increased safety is smaller than the cost of excessive self-reporting.  
 
4.3. Discussion and perspectives 
 
We have shown that in cases where the overall damage cost with self-reporting is not 
greater than without self-reporting, 
1
maxH L i
i N
C C m
≤ ≤
> + , and if the collective penalty is 
greater than 
1
maxL i
i N
C m
≤ ≤
+ , the collective penalty will provide incentives for self-
reporting that will result in the first-best outcome and will prevent the payment of the 
draconian collective penalty. If political economy reasons lead to a collective penalty that 
is smaller than
1
maxL i
i N
C m
≤ ≤
+ , the collective penalty will be paid if it is small and below 
1
min L i
i N
C m
N≤ ≤
+ , and producers will assume a relatively low level of care. If the 
constrained penalty is sufficiently high, above 
1
max L i
i N
C m
N≤ ≤
+  (yet below 
1
maxL i
i N
C m
≤ ≤
+ ), there is a potential for collective action that will lead to self-reporting 
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and avoidance of the payment of the collective penalty. We introduced a mutual 
insurance scheme that will lead to such collective action. It assumes transaction costs are 
zero or at least so low as to not exhaust the gains from cooperation. The scheme also 
assumed that agents have full information on each others’ containment costs and some 
degree of social capital that will allow collaboration. Several features of industrial 
organization and community interaction make us believe that the application of the 
schemes suggested here does have some interest as an alternative means of regulation 
whenever government monitoring is prohibitively costly. Industries tend to locate in 
clusters or at least interact in industrial associations which permit some information 
exchange which would make agents have better information about each other than the 
regulator. In the context of environmental policy, agricultural settings with several 
sources located in the same geographical neighborhood constitute another area of 
application of the mechanism suggested here. 
The outcome of collective action when the collective penalty is constrained and 
1
maxH L i
i N
C C m
≤ ≤
> + , is more efficient than the outcome without cooperation when the 
collective penalty is paid. The collective action does not improve the level of care, but 
reduces the overall expected damage cost. Because of the low level of care, due to the 
constrained collective penalty, the outcome of self-reporting under collective action is 
inefficient, though. Increases in the collective penalty K will increase the overall 
efficiency of the collective action outcome as it will lead to firms taking a higher level of 
care. With a constraint on the collective penalty the mechanism of mutual insurance will 
thus lead to a welfare improvement but not to the first-best outcome. One mechanism that 
would lead to the first-best outcome is a well-functioning honor system. With an honor 
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system individuals will assume responsibility for their action, self-report and pay 
L iC m+ . That will lead to the optimal level of care defined in Equation (1): CiX . Honor 
systems are frequently associated with collective penalties. Economists may be too 
pessimistic about the occurrence of honor systems, as some evidence discussed by 
Dubner and Levitt (2004) show. Our analysis provides a case where society would 
benefit from the emergence of honor code systems since this is the only system that will 
result in a first-best outcome under a case of constrained collective penalties. For other 
cases, we have shown that mutual insurance schemes may have agents self-report 
accidents and, although second-best, this policy will improve welfare compared to the 
constrained initial situation. 
The desired performance of self-reporting is not obtained in cases where some 
agents have a high cost of early containment and self-reporting, so that H L iC C m≤ + . In 
particular, in the case when H L iC C m NK≤ + ≤ , self-reporting by these agents is 
suboptimal. This case is quite unlikely, though, since it would imply that the costs of self-
reporting and early containment are so high that they eliminate the damage cost reduction 
from early action. It serves as a reminder, though, that collective action is no panacea; in 
some cases where the collective penalty is constrained, collective action may not be 
socially optimal and may lead to excessive self-reporting. 
 
5. Conclusions 
The paper has shown that random accidents can be contained by a policy of collective 
penalties. The penalties are not likely to be enforced but rather induce self-reporting that 
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enhances welfare due to early containment. The success of this policy depends on 
political commitment to establish sufficiently high penalties. When the penalty is equal to 
or greater than the damage caused by an accident, the collective penalty will lead to the 
first-best outcome. Penalties below the damage cost may lead to the first-best outcome 
only under an honor system. Otherwise, systems of mutual insurance may lead to self-
reporting, but with higher probability of accidents than socially optimal. The magnitude 
of the social benefits induced by self-reporting largely depends on the cost saving 
because of early containment. The self-reporting also reduces the harsh impact that 
implementation of collective penalties may have on producers. The harshness of 
collective penalties may prevent one from using it regularly, but in some situations it may 
be used for a transitional period until routine monitoring is introduced. Outbreaks of 
disease, such as the avian flu, illustrate the importance of early warning when timely 
reporting and response reduce damage costs. In cases of routine pollution, when detection 
of due care may be easy, monitoring remains the appropriate policy. 
  The comparison between collective penalties and investment in monitoring 
depends on the efficiency of the monitoring technology and the urgency with which a 
response must be obtained. In cases where there is a new externality or a source of 
damage that requires a fast response, or when routine monitoring of pollution carries a 
low probability of detection, and the regulator has limited capacity to monitor all agents, 
collective penalties may be used or introduced as a threat. Building monitoring systems 
takes time and can be extremely expensive, so collective penalties can complement or be 
substitutes for monitoring.  
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Future research could extend the model in several directions. The analysis 
considered the case when the damage of the accident is known with certainty, and the 
model could be extended to analyze the case when the damage is random. Even under 
random damages, imposing collective penalties equal to the realized damages will induce 
self-reporting if the expected damage does not increase with self-reporting. The analysis 
could also be expanded to situations where the identity of the agent that caused the 
accident may be known with some probability to the regulator or other members of the 
industry. Collective penalties seem to be effective in these cases, and the incentives to 
self-report may actually increase. It may also be useful to consider the performance of 
systems that combine random monitoring and self-reporting with collective penalties, 
especially in situations when the capacity to utilize these two approaches is constrained 
technically or politically. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Proof of Proposition 1:  
We know that P = CH  yields the level of care NiX  (defined in Equation 2). 
The conditions that determine whether an agent self-reports or not are: 
1 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0S S N S N Si i i i i i i i H i i S i iif X X m g X C g X F g Xδ π π= − − + − ≥   (A1)  
0 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0S S N S N Si i i i i i i i H i i S i iif X X m g X C g X F g Xδ π π= − − + − <   (A2) 
          
With P = CH  and FS = CL, individual agents’ choice of self-reporting will coincide with 
the socially optimal choice of self-reporting as defined in Equations (4a). Thus, when the 
regulator knows the damage levels CH and CL,  Si iδ γ= , and the first-best choices are 
implemented: NiX , 
S C
i iX X= . Q.E.D.  
 
Proof of Proposition 2: 
Private surplus: 
If agent i self-reports then 
 
1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
N
i i H i i i i L i i i H j j
i j SR
Max X C g X Max X C m g X C g Xπ π
= ≠
  − < − + −     ∑ ∑  
by a revealed preference argument. 
 
It follows directly from πi Xi( ) decreasing and concave in Xi, and N Si iX X− > 0, that 
( ) ( ) 0S Ni i i iX Xπ π− > . 
 
The environmental impact: 
Define the elasticity of the accident probability function (evaluated at SiX ) as 
( )
( )
S S
i i i
gX S
i i i
g X X
X g X
ε ∂= − ∂ . 
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Use the fact that 
'( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
S
N N S S N S Si i i i
i i i i i i i i i i
i i
g X g Xg X X X g X X X g X
X X
∂ ∂= − + ≥ − +∂ ∂
           (A3) 
for 'S Ni i iX X X< < . 
 
Hence, a sufficient condition for a positive environmental impact is: 
 
( )( )( ) ( ) ( ) 0SN S S Si iH i i i i L i i i
i
g XC X X g X C m g X
X
 ∂− + − + > ∂ 
.   (A4) 
 
Rearranging terms and multiplying by SiX  gives 
 
( )( )
( )
S S S
L i Hi i i i
S N S
i i i H i i
C m Cg X X X
X g X C X X
+ −∂ >∂ −  .     (A5) 
 
 
Rewriting using the definition of the elasticity of the accident probability function gives: 
 
( ) SH L i i
gX N S
H i i
C C m X
C X X
ε − +< − .  Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3b: 
For all agents j i≠  to want to exclude agent i the following condition has to hold: 
 
( )
( )
1
( ) ( ) ( )
2
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
( ) ( )
j j k
j j k
M M M k
j j j j L j j k k
k j i
M M M Mk i
j j j j L j j k k i i
k j i
N
K K
i i i i
i
SX g X C m S g X
N
S SX g X C m S g X g X
N N
X g X K
π
π
π
≠ ≠
≠ ≠
=
 − + − − ≥ − 
   − + − − − ≥   − −   
−
∑
∑
∑
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( ) ( ) 0
2
kM Mk
k k i i i
k j i
Sg X g X S
N≠ ≠
 ⇔ − + ≥ − ∑      (A6) 
 
For a given N and j, when im →∞ , the above expression  →∞ .  
 
Condition (A6) that indicates when a group of agents want to exclude an agent with 
significantly higher self-reporting costs can be rewritten as a condition on the 
heterogeneity of self-reporting costs: 
 
( ) ( )1( ) ( )
2
kMM
i i L i k k L k
k j i
g X C m K g X C m K
N ≠ ≠
+ − ≥ + −− ∑ .  Q.E.D 
 
Proof of Proposition 4: 
(iii): 
Under collective action with side-payment Si, MiX =
K
iX , and the agents will organize 
self-reporting if and only if L iNK C m≥ +  
 
(i) and (ii): 
If  
( )
( ) 0
1
L jK
j j
j i
C m K
g X K i
N≠
 + −− ≥ ∀ −  
∑  and HNK C< , then 
( ) 0Kj j H L j
j i
g X C C m i
≠
 − − > ∀ ∑ , and 
 
[ ]
1
( ) 0
N
K
i i H L i
i
g X C C m
=
− − >∑ .  Q.E.D. 
